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The authors investigated spatial, temporal, and attentional manipulations in a short-term repetition
priming paradigm. Brief primes produced a strong preference to choose the primed alternative, whereas
long primes had the opposite effect. However, a 2nd brief presentation of a long prime produced a preference
for the primed word despite the long total prime duration. These surprising results are explained by a
computational model that posits the offsetting components of source confusion (prime features are confused
with target features) and discounting (evidence from primed features is discounted). The authors obtained
compelling evidence for these components by showing how they can cooperate or compete through different
manipulations of prime salience. The model allows for dissociations between prime salience and the
magnitude of priming, thereby providing a unified account of “subliminal” and “supraliminal” priming.
Information processing is influenced by the prior presentation of
related stimuli (i.e., primes), even if these stimuli are irrelevant to
the task at hand. Such priming effects are used to investigate
knowledge representation, the dynamics of perception and re-
trieval, and decisional factors as determined by task demands (e.g.,
Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; Tipper, 2001).
In examining priming phenomena, it is useful to differentiate
between paradigms that separate prime and target by a substantial
amount of time (i.e., long-term priming) and those that present
primes immediately prior to targets (i.e., short-term priming).
Unless otherwise specified, the term priming in this article refers
to short-term priming. Priming has been studied for tasks such as
naming, identification at threshold, and lexical decision. In this
study, we investigated priming in forced choice perceptual iden-
tification of briefly flashed words, which we have found to be a
useful method for separating perceptual and decisional factors.1
Many studies have used priming as a tool for studying the structure
of the mental lexicon. For instance, a lexical decision response to a
word (e.g., BUTTER) is faster when primed by a semantically related
word (e.g., BREAD) than when primed by a less related control word
(e.g., DOCTOR; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1976). It is somewhat sur-
prising that such priming occurs even when the primes themselves are
extremely difficult to identify. In fact, priming occurs even when the
observer cannot judge whether any prime has been presented (e.g.,
Marcel, 1983). Such effects are often referred to as showing sublim-
inal or unconscious perception (for reviews, see Merikle & Daneman,
1998; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001).2
1 In this article, we use the terms decision and decisional in a very
general sense to mean some aspect of evidence evaluation that is dictated
by the pressures of optimal performance. Note that this does not imply that
the decision process is subject to conscious awareness or that it always
yields an optimal outcome. It is important to note that throughout this
article, our classification of effects as perceptual (i.e., influenced by the
perceptual response to the target presentation) and decisional or preferen-
tial (i.e., independent of the perceptual response to the target presentation)
is somewhat different from the concepts of sensitivity and bias used in
signal detection theory (e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) and does not
imply differential stages or levels of processing (e.g., preferential effects
need not be postperceptual; see Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, & Ruys, 2001, for a
detailed discussion of this terminology).
2 The question of when (if ever) perception should be considered to
occur unconsciously is highly dependent on a theory of consciousness.
Such a theory, however, is seldom explicitly specified, nor is such an
endeavor necessary to investigate the effect. Thus, for the sake of clarity,
we avoid the terms subliminal and unconscious and instead simply describe
these results as showing a dissociation between priming and prime detec-
tion (prime detection is indexed by above-chance performance in explicitly
identifying trials containing a prime).
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Priming Without Prime Detection
Dissociations between priming and prime detection are usually
achieved by either presenting the prime(s) very briefly (usually
followed by a backward mask) or by using a task that diverts
attention from the prime(s) (see Merikle et al., 2001). Naive
intuition suggests that the amount of priming should be directly
related to the strength of perception: A highly salient prime should
cause more priming than a minimally salient (e.g., undetected)
prime. Such a prediction is consistent with theories in which
activation spreads from the prime’s lexical node to other lexical
nodes that are semantically related (see, e.g., McNamara, 1992, for
a review of these mechanisms and some specific theories of
priming). However, this prediction is often violated. For instance,
Marcel (1983, Experiment 5) found sizable priming for undetected
primes, an effect that increased when the primes where repeated on
different trials, even though the primes remained undetected, and
Forster and Veres (1998) found robust form priming for word
targets with briefly presented (i.e., 50-ms, pre- and postmasked)
primes, which was disrupted when the primes were displayed for
500 ms. Furthermore, Huber (2005b; see also Figure 8 of Huber &
O’Reilly, 2003) found that the priming effect for very brief prime
presentations (as short as 17 ms, postmasked by the target presen-
tation) could be as large or larger than that for prime durations that
were clearly above threshold. This dissociation between priming
magnitude and prime detection is poorly accounted for by most
theories of priming due to their constraint to produce a direct
relationship between the magnitude of priming and the degree of
prime salience.
Early theories of priming can be separated into activation-based
(Collins & Loftus, 1975; McNamara, 1992) and memory retrieval
accounts (Dosher & Rosedale, 1989; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988).
In either case, the prime directly adds to target processing, either
as a function of residual activation or through enhanced memory
cuing. Therefore, both model classes suppose a positive relation-
ship between the availability or strength of the prime and the
degree of priming benefit. This direct relationship between prime
salience and priming magnitude is true even of newer, linguisti-
cally sophisticated models such as the DRC (dual-route cascaded)
model of visual word recognition and reading aloud (Coltheart,
Rastle, Perry, Langdon, & Ziegler, 2001), the MROM (multiple
read-out model; Grainger & Jacobs, 1996), and connectionist
accounts (as exemplified by Plaut & Booth, 2000). Although these
theories are tremendously successful in explaining a wide variety
of lexical phenomena, they do not contain mechanisms for cap-
turing this fundamental dissociation between prime salience and
the strength of priming. It is not our intent to supplant such theories
but, rather, to suggest that they require augmentation with com-
pensatory mechanisms to capture this dissociation, particularly in
the case of above-threshold presentations: The severity of the
dissociation is seen most clearly in recent research by Huber et al.
(2001) in which increasing prime salience to an excessively high
degree (as compared with traditional priming paradigms) not only
failed to further increase priming benefits but actually resulted in
robust priming deficits.
To explain these and many other unanticipated priming effects,
Huber et al. (2001) developed a new model of short-term priming
called responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence
(ROUSE). The critical effects were found in two conditions,
termed passive priming and active priming. Passive priming in-
volved an attempt to reduce prime saliency and attention allocated
to the prime by instructing observers to ignore primes (which were
presented for 500 ms; Huber et al., 2001) and to treat them merely
as a warning signal for the subsequent target flash. Active priming
involved an attempt to maximize prime salience either by asking
observers to make judgments about prime words (e.g., “Could this
word be a verb?”; Huber et al., 2001) or by presenting primes for
longer than usual durations (Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, & Quach,
2002). The results in these forced choice perceptual identification
tasks were initially unanticipated: Although passive priming pro-
duced a benefit when the target was primed and a deficit when the
incorrect alternative (the foil) was primed (i.e., a preference for the
primed word), active priming produced the opposite pattern of
results, with a deficit when the target was primed and a benefit
when the foil was primed (i.e., a preference against the primed
word). Thus, depending on the prime condition (i.e., priming of
target or foil) and the nature of prime processing (i.e., passive or
active), the same prime word could cause an increase or a decrease
in performance.
The ROUSE model accounts for these (and other) findings by
incorporating two key assumptions:
1. Prime and target features become confused into one
percept (source confusion).
2. The expectation of source confusion is used to compen-
sate the evidence assigned to primed items (discounting).
The details are given below, but the key result is that the direction
and amount of priming are determined by the difference between
the degree of confusion caused by primes and the estimate of
source confusion when the system calculates evidence. With two
separate factors determining this difference, the magnitude of the
difference, and therefore the magnitude of priming, need not
increase as a function of prime saliency. In fact, Huber et al. (2001)
found that making the difference positive for passive priming (low
salience) and negative for active priming (high salience) accounted
for the observed reversal in the direction of priming.
Within this framework, it is easy to explain the dissociation
between prime detectability and degree of priming: If the differ-
ence between source confusion and discounting is about equal for
primes near detection threshold and primes above threshold, then
the degree of priming will not differ between these conditions.
Why might this difference be roughly equal in these two cases?
For a prime just below detection threshold, it seems unlikely that
the decision system could know that source confusion has taken
place (i.e., there is little or no discounting). Of course, for such a
weak prime, there will be less source confusion, but the full force
of this source confusion will be felt in the absence of discount-
ing, and the net result will be a positive priming effect. For
above-threshold primes, the size of the difference (and the
direction of the difference) will be determined by the estimate
of source confusion. Accurate estimation will produce a zero
difference, but if the estimate is slightly in error, the difference
will again be small and not necessarily larger than that for
near-threshold primes.
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Spatiotemporal Determinants of Priming
It is a key assumption of the ROUSE model that features of the
prime become confused with the target percept. But what causes or
allows such confusions? Plausible candidates are
1. orthographic, phonological, and semantic similarity of
prime and target;
2. nearby spatial position of prime and target; and
3. nearby temporal position of prime and target.
Not only prime saliency and detectability but also orthographic,
phonological, and semantic similarity have received considerable
empirical and theoretical attention. However, effects of spatiotem-
poral separation between prime and target have been the focus of
comparatively few studies.
Temporal Relations
Humphreys, Besner, and Quinlan (1988) used repetition priming
in a perceptual identification task. They compared identification
performance for targets that were preceded by a brief (55-ms,
premasked) prime with that for targets preceded by a longer
(300-ms, no-premask) prime.3 Brief primes increased and long
primes decreased identification accuracy. In their Experiment 4,
Humphreys et al. inserted a 120-ms pattern mask between a
180-ms (no-premask) prime and the target and found positive
priming. These results align well with recent results that inspired
and tested the ROUSE model (e.g., Huber et al., 2001; Huber,
Shiffrin, Quach, & Lyle, 2002) and with the results presented in
the current article. However, because temporal separation between
prime and target was confounded with prime duration in Hum-
phreys et al.’s experiments, it is unclear whether (a) priming was
affected by temporal separation or (b) these results can be entirely
attributed to the effect of prime duration.
Hochhaus and Marohn (1991) also varied the timing between
prime and target. Their Experiment 1 used a perceptual identifi-
cation task: A 500-ms prime was followed by the target (with
interstimulus intervals [ISIs] of 0, 250, or 1,500 ms). Using a
single test word and same–different testing, Hochhaus and
Marohn found decreased sensitivity for primed targets at the 0-ms
ISI and no priming effects for longer ISIs (they interpreted the
former result as a form of repetition blindness, a phenomenon we
take up in this article’s General Discussion).4 This result suggests
that priming is disrupted or diminished when primes and targets
are separated by a sufficiently long (e.g., 250-ms) intervening
stimulus. Therefore, to better understand the temporal dynamics of
priming, in Experiment 1 we separated primes and targets by much
briefer intervals than those used by Hochhaus and Marohn.
Spatial Relations
In their Experiment 4, Hochhaus and Marohn (1991) manipu-
lated the vertical distance of a 500-ms prime relative to a central
target. They found a substantial priming effect at all tested dis-
tances (between 0° and 1.68° of visual angle), but the effect was
larger for smaller distances. However, this finding of a decreasing
priming effect with increasing distance between prime and target is
not universal. Stankiewicz and Hummel (2002), for example,
demonstrated that visual object priming is not affected by a dis-
tance of 5° of visual angle between prime and target. Dill and
Edelman (2001) offered a possible resolution to such a discrepancy
by suggesting that translation-invariant priming only applies to
local features (and objects that can be identified on the basis of
only such features), whereas priming for global structure depends
on spatial proximity. Ashby, Prinzmetal, Ivry, and Maddox (1996),
using a different paradigm, showed that errors in feature binding
(e.g., illusory conjunctions) depend on the spatial proximity of the
features to each other. This result supports the claim that spatial
confusions may be partly responsible for priming when feature
binding is necessary for the task.
In the experiments of Huber et al. (2001), the primes, target
flash, and choices were arrayed in different spatial positions
(primes up and down, target central, choices left and right, with
less than 3° of visual separation). Sizable priming effects were
observed (albeit in a direction that changed with priming condi-
tion). In more recent experiments (reviewed by Huber & O’Reilly,
2003), a single prime word was presented twice simultaneously—
one instance above the other, just touching—followed by a central
target that overlapped the lower half of the upper prime and the
upper half of the lower prime. These experiments yielded consid-
erably larger priming effects than had previous studies, but it is
likely that the increased priming was due less to the increased
proximity of primes than to the fact that there was only a single,
unique prime word. Such a conclusion is suggested by the results
of Huber et al.’s (2001) Experiment 4, in which a single prime was
repeated but without spatial overlap with the target: Enhanced
priming was observed in this condition, too.
The spatial manipulations discussed above occurred across dif-
ferent experiments and priming conditions. Therefore, we de-
signed the present experiments to provide better data concern-
ing the role of spatial distance in priming. Furthermore, we
were interested in possible interactions between spatial and
temporal distance manipulations, so we covaried these factors
in Experiment 1.
3 Humphreys et al. (1988) labeled these conditions as involving masked
and unmasked primes, respectively (referring to the presence of a forward
mask in the former case and its absence in the latter). Because recent
evidence suggests that the crucial difference between the two priming
conditions was not the presence or absence of a forward mask but, rather,
prime duration (e.g., Huber, Shiffrin, Quach, & Lyle, 2002; cf. also the
results of Humphreys et al.’s, 1988, Experiment 4), and because primes
were postmasked by the target presentation in both conditions, we prefer to
refer to these prime presentations as brief and long, respectively.
4 Hochhaus and Marohn (1991, Experiment 1) also used a 0-ms ISI
condition with a 250-ms prime. This shorter prime duration produced no
repetition blindness (in fact, nonsignificant positive priming was found).
Other studies have produced significant positive priming for prime dura-
tions as long as 500 ms (e.g., Huber et al., 2001). Taking into account
differences in instructions, prime presentation, and task, which can have
profound effects even when prime duration is held constant (see, e.g., the
current Experiment 3), the qualitative difference in repetition blindness for
the two prime durations is naturally predicted by the ROUSE model.
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Combining Primes Across Time and Space
A related and perhaps more important issue concerns the way
that multiple primes combine at different times and different
positions to influence target processing. This is a critical issue
because ROUSE posits two factors that determine priming: source
confusion and discounting. These separate factors may be differ-
entially affected by spatial and temporal variations, providing
converging evidence for the existence of these factors. In Exper-
iments 1 and 2, we examined the effect of multiple prime presen-
tations of different durations and spatial positions in the same trial.
We generalized these results in Experiment 3, presenting two
primes concurrently but with instructions to ignore one and ac-
tively process the other.
Perceptual Identification
Most priming studies use tasks like lexical decision or naming,
with response time as the dependent measure. It has long been
recognized that interpretation of such findings is difficult because
effects could be due to perceptual changes, changes in the prefer-
ence to respond with a primed alternative (also known as deci-
sional bias; see Footnote 1), or both. To distinguish perception
from preference, Huber et al. (2001) borrowed a technique used
with great success by Ratcliff and McKoon (1997; see also Rat-
cliff, McKoon, & Verwoerd, 1989) for the study of long-term
priming. They used a two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) per-
ceptual identification paradigm requiring the matching of a briefly
flashed and postmasked target word to one of two subsequently
presented choice words (accuracy was the measure of interest). In
Huber et al.’s (2001) experiments, the presentation of the target
was closely preceded by the presentation of two prime words.
Perceptual and preferential priming factors can be separately as-
sessed by testing conditions that prime both choices, only the
correct choice (i.e., the target), only the incorrect choice (i.e., the
foil), or neither choice. A difference between the foil-primed
condition and the neither-primed condition indicates a preference
effect, because the display in both conditions is identical until the
presentation of the choice words (the same is true for a comparison
of the both-primed condition and the target-primed condition).
Conversely, a benefit for the both-primed condition over the
neither-primed condition indicates a perceptual effect, because the
target has been primed, but with the foil also primed, decisional
effects are properly controlled. Studies using this paradigm have
varied the relation of primes to choice words, the similarity of
primes to choice words, the duration of primes, attention to primes,
the similarity of primes to each other, and the similarity of choice
words to each other, and they have related memory for primes to
the pattern of priming (Huber, 2005b; Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, &
Quach, 2002; Huber et al., 2001; Huber, Shiffrin, Quach, & Lyle,
2002).
A closely related method for separating perceptual and prefer-
ential factors is the use of a single test word with a same–different
task (e.g., Hochhaus & Johnston, 1996; Paap, Johansen, Chun, &
Vonnahme, 2000, Experiments 4a and 4b). A signal detection
analysis of such data, applied separately for primed test words and
unprimed test words, produces a bias measure that indicates pref-
erence effects (i.e., did the bias change for primed words?) and a
sensitivity measure that indicates perceptual effects (i.e., after bias
was controlled for, did performance increase?). The results of both
types of studies highlight the importance of the decision process in
short-term priming: Preference effects were found to be large, and
they changed direction depending on the way primes were pro-
cessed, whereas perceptual effects were much smaller or missing
(e.g., Huber et al., 2001; Paap et al., 2000, Experiments 4a and 4b).
ROUSE
To account for a variety of findings from 2-AFC perceptual
identification paradigms, Huber et al. (2001) developed a quanti-
tative model of short-term priming, ROUSE. This model incorpo-
rates the offsetting mechanisms of source confusion and discount-
ing. ROUSE is a Bayesian decision theory, similar in spirit to the
REM (retrieving effectively from memory) model of Shiffrin and
Steyvers (1997; see also Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1998) and its recent
variants (e.g., Schooler, Shiffrin, & Raaijmakers’s, 2001, REMI
[retrieving effectively from memory, implicit] model for long-term
priming). In ROUSE, all representations are feature based, and a
Bayesian decision process arrives at a nearly optimal response
conditioned on noisy perception and/or noisy memory. The theory
has two parts: Unknown sources of evidence refers to the assump-
tion that features of the choice words can be activated by the prime
presentation, the target presentation, or visual noise, with the
actual source of activation being unknown to the system (i.e.,
source confusion). In isolation, this factor causes a preference for
prime-related choice words. The Bayesian decision process (re-
sponding optimally) removes, or even reverses, this preference
through the discounting of evidence from features known to have
been in the primes. The reversal of preference across experimental
conditions is explained in ROUSE terms by too little discounting
for brief prime durations and appropriate or too much discounting
for longer prime durations (Huber et al., 2001; Huber, Shiffrin,
Quach, & Lyle, 2002). Below, we present the unknown sources of
evidence part of the theory first, and then we review the Bayesian
decision process.
Unknown Sources of Evidence
In ROUSE, each choice word is represented by a vector of
binary features (typically set to 20; Huber et al., 2001). Features in
the choice words can be independently activated (i.e., perceived)
by three sources of evidence. Assume for now that the two choice
words share no features. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the
following activation processes (Huber et al., 2001):
1. Prime presentation: With probability , primed features
are activated.
2. Target presentation: With probability , target features
are activated.
3. Visual noise: With probability , any feature is activated.
Source confusion, if not somehow countered, will always lead to
a preference for primed choice words due to the additional (often
misleading) evidence supplied by the prime. The probability of the
prime activating primed features of a choice word determines the
amount of additional evidence, and therefore,  is the primary
determinant of source confusion. However, the decision process in
ROUSE counteracts this preference by differentially weighting
evidence on the basis of its diagnostic value.
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Responding Optimally
To determine the amount of evidence that should be assigned to
any particular feature of a choice word, the system needs to know
whether the feature is inactive or active and which sources might
have caused activation. If the prime is a potential source of
activation (i.e., if it is known that an activated feature has been
primed), then the evidence assigned to this feature should be less
because the prime, rather than the target, may have been the source
of activation. We term this downward adjustment of evidence
discounting.5 To calculate the level of discounting in an optimal
fashion, the system needs to know the activation probabilities , ,
and . These activation probabilities are not generally quantities
that can be known to the decision system, because, among other
things, they depend on details of the particular task. Thus, the
evidence calculations need to be carried out with estimates of these
quantities. The estimates the system uses to discount and, more
generally, to evaluate evidence are termed , , and , respec-
tively (these estimates turn out to be very close to the true values,
but the difference between  and  is a critical element of the
model).
A Bayesian calculation yields the following odds (i.e., ratio of
posterior likelihoods) for the target choice over the foil choice
(assuming that each feature contributes an independent source of
evidence; Huber et al., 2001):
TF 

i1
N pVTi|T is target
pVTi|T is foil 

j1
N pVFj|F is target
pVFj|F is foil 
, (1)
where T refers to the target word, F refers to the foil word, and
V(Ti) and V(Fi) represent binary values denoting the state of
activation of the i-th feature of the target and the foil, respectively.
The products in the numerator and denominator of Equation 1 are
the posterior likelihood that the target and the foil, respectively,
were presented during the target flash, as determined from the N
word features. When equal prior probabilities are assumed (as is
appropriate for most experimental designs), a normative decision
process will choose the word with the greater likelihood ratio (in
the case of equal likelihood ratios, a random decision is made).
As Huber et al. (2001) pointed out, there are only three possible
expressions for the product terms (i.e., the evidence provided by
5 This is the same concept as explaining away in the study of Bayesian
belief networks (i.e., the activation of the feature is “explained away” by
the prime, and therefore the probability that the activation was due to the
target is less; see, e.g., Wellman & Henrion, 1993).
Figure 1. In ROUSE (responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence), words are represented as
vectors of binary features. Choice-word features can be independently activated by three sources of evidence: the
prime presentation (with probability ), the target presentation (with probability ), and visual noise (with
probability ). Feature activation by the prime presentation depends on the similarity of the prime to the choice
words, which is assumed to be 0 for unrelated primes and 1 for identical primes (denoted by the dashed arrows).
The prime is repeated in the figure solely for consistency with the prime presentation in the present experiments.
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each feature) of Equation 1. These expressions depend on the state
of activation of the feature and whether a prime is a potential
source of activation. Figure 2 presents the expressions for feature
evidence for the four combinations of feature activation and
priming.
The numerators in the fractions of Figure 2 are the probability
that a feature has its respective state of activation given the
potential sources of activation, assuming the feature belongs to the
target. The denominators are this same probability, assuming the
feature does not belong to the target. For instance, consider the
upper left-hand panel, in which the feature has not been primed
and is inactive. In the numerator, the target flash and noise could
have activated the feature, yet both of these sources must have
failed to activate the feature, and so the probability is (1 	 ) (1 	
). In the denominator, only noise could have activated the feature,
and so the probability is 1 	 . The value of this fraction deter-
mines the amount of evidence contributed by each feature. The
more this ratio differs from 1, the more evidence is contributed by
the corresponding feature (the evidence is against the respective
choice word when the ratio is less than 1 and for the respective
choice word when it is larger than 1). As can be seen in Figure 2,
activated features that are known to have appeared in the prime(s)
are assigned a discounted level of evidence compared with acti-
vated features that did not appear in a prime. The critical difference
between the upper right-hand fraction and the discounted fraction
in the lower right-hand panel is the inclusion of the prime as a
potential source of activation (i.e., the inclusion of the 1 	 
terms). Therefore,  is the primary determinant for the strength of
discounting.
The qualitative predictions of ROUSE are not much affected by
differences between  and its estimate  or between  and its
estimate , so these estimates were set equal to the actual values
(i.e.,  :  and  : ). However, model behavior critically
depends on the amount and direction of the difference between the
true probability of prime activation (, i.e., the main determinant
of source confusion) and its estimate (, which determines dis-
counting). For long prime durations, fitting the model revealed that
 
 , in which case primed features are discounted too heavily,
resulting in a preference against primed choice words. For short
prime durations, fitting the model revealed that   , in which
case primed features are not discounted enough, resulting in a
preference for primed choice words.
Huber, Shiffrin, Quach, & Lyle (2002) provided evidence for
another assumption of the model, that discounting of evidence
should only apply to activated features known to be shared with a
prime: The direction and degree of priming was strongly deter-
mined by the ability to identify the primes, as revealed by a
prime-recognition test immediately following forced choice iden-
tification. When the primes are readily identifiable (as was likely
the case in all experiments reported by Huber et al., 2001), it is
assumed that it is known which features of the choice words were
primed and, therefore, which features to discount.6 However, at
very brief prime durations, the prime might not be identifiable, and
prime features may not be accessible to the discounting process. In
this case,  equals 0, and there is no discounting, such that even
a small amount of source confusion could have a sizable effect.
The evidence from the present experiments bears on this
hypothesis.7
Experiment 1
We designed Experiment 1 to investigate (a) how variations in
spatiotemporal separation between prime and target affect priming
and (b) how near-threshold and above-threshold primes combine
to produce priming effects. The former issue was addressed by
crossing two levels of spatial separation (0 vs. 1 line) with two
6 We draw a distinction between the system’s knowledge of primed
features and conscious experience of the prime. It is reasonable to assume
that these concepts are correlated and, particularly, that once a prime can
be identified, its features are accessible to the discounting process. How-
ever, we do not claim that conscious experience is necessary for discount-
ing to take place or that discounting for primes that can be identified is
necessarily excessive.
7 Huber and O’Reilly (2003) reformulated ROUSE as a Bayesian net-
work, demonstrating that a diminished certainty as to which features to
discount can perform the same role as underestimation of the prime-
activation probability. It is unclear which of these mathematically equiv-
alent interpretations of underdiscounting is appropriate for very short prime
durations.
Figure 2. The evidence provided by features, contingent on the two states of activation and the two states of
priming. The numerator in each fraction is conditional on the feature being shared with the target (and not the
foil); the denominator is conditional on the feature being shared with the foil (and not the target). Features that
are shared between the target and the foil do not provide discriminating information and are ignored in the
decision process.  and  refer to the probabilities of feature activation by the target presentation and visual
noise, respectively. In theory, their estimates ( and ) should be used, but as discussed in the text,  and 
are assumed to be estimated correctly.  denotes the estimated probability of feature activation by the prime
presentation.
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levels of temporal separation (50 vs. 100 ms) between termination
of the prime and onset of the target flash.8 We investigated the
latter issue with three conditions, using a long-duration prime
(1,000 ms), a short-duration prime (50 ms), and a long-then-short
prime (which was presented first for 950 ms and then again for 50
ms at a different spatial position).
It was unclear how two presentations of the same prime word
would combine to affect source confusion and discounting. A
simple combination rule might treat the amount of source confu-
sion and discounting for the two back-to-back prime presentations
as equivalent to that produced by a single presentation with the
combined duration of both presentations (in this case, the results
for the 1,000-ms and 95050-ms prime-presentation conditions
should be identical). In an alternative combination rule, the two
prime presentations might combine independently, producing ef-
fects due to the summation of separate levels of source confusion
and discounting (in this case, underdiscounting of the brief prime
presentation should counteract the overdiscounting of the long
prime presentation).
It is easiest to discriminate alternative hypotheses when exper-
imental effects are largest. Huber (2005b; see also Huber &
O’Reilly, 2003) found increased priming effects through the use of
a single prime (presented simultaneously in two locations, above
and below fixation) rather than two different primes. We therefore
adopted this procedure.
Method
Participants. Sixty-nine undergraduate students at Indiana University
Bloomington participated in exchange for introductory psychology course
credit.
Materials. We used the same pool of 1,000 five-letter words used in
previous repetition priming experiments by Huber, Shiffrin, Quach, and
Lyle (2002) and Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, and Quach (2002). The minimum
written-language frequency of these words was 4 per million, as defined
and measured by Kucˇera and Francis (1967). All words were presented in
uppercase, using a fixed-width, 22-point font. The pattern mask for the
target consisted of a row of six @ signs. Its height was adjusted (19 point,
boldface) to correspond to the height of the letters, and its presentation was
centered over the area where the target had been presented.
Equipment and display. All stimuli were displayed on 17-in. (43.18-
cm) PC CRT monitors with a vertical refresh rate of 120 Hz and a screen
resolution of 800  600 pixels. The display was synchronized to the
vertical refresh using the ExpLib programming library (Cohen & Sautner,
2001). This provided display increments of 8.33 ms.
The stimuli were presented in white against a black background. Each
participant sat in an enclosed booth with dim lighting. The distance of the
monitor, the presentation positions, and the font size were chosen such that
the target and the 50- and 1,000-ms primes encompassed less than 3° of
vertical visual angle, and the 950-ms primes encompassed between 3° and
4° of vertical visual angle. The horizontal visual angle encompassed by the
primes and the target was around 3°. Each prime presentation consisted of
the same prime word presented simultaneously in two locations: symmet-
rically above and below fixation (see Figure 3), thus minimizing any
tendency for eye movements to the prime.
Responses for the 2-AFC test were collected through a standard com-
puter keyboard. Participants were asked to press the Z key or the slash key
to choose the left or right alternative, respectively.
Procedure. Four factors were crossed within subject. Figure 3 illus-
trates the different conditions.
There were three priming conditions: neither primed (i.e., the prime was
different from both choice words), target primed (i.e., the prime was
identical to the target), and foil primed (i.e., the prime was identical to the
foil). Words were randomly sampled without replacement such that each
word only appeared on one trial in the experiment (nonrepetition of words
across trials eliminated the possibility of contamination from long-term
repetition priming).
There were six spatiotemporal conditions for priming: For each of the
following three conditions, the two vertically aligned presentations of the
(last) prime word were presented either with no separation (the bottom of
the top presentation was touching, but not overlapping with, the top of the
bottom presentation) or with one text-line separation (one row of mask
characters separated the two vertically aligned prime presentations). In all
cases, the most recent primes were followed immediately by a large mask
of @ signs. The prime word was presented (a) for 1,000 ms, (b) for 50 ms,
or (c) first with high vertical eccentricity for 950 ms and then again more
centrally for an additional 50 ms, as in the 50-ms condition. Participants
were instructed that in the 95050-ms condition, the same prime word
would appear in two separate back-to-back presentations (they were told
that the prime word would move to a more central position for a second,
brief presentation). Finally, the delay between prime offset and target onset
(henceforth termed delay) was either 50 ms or 100 ms (see Footnote 8).
During the delay, a mask was presented consisting of five rows of @ signs
presented in vertical alignment with no space between the rows and no
spaces between characters. Its presentation was centered over the display
such that the entire area where primes could appear was covered.
Prior to the prime display, a fixation point was presented at the center of
the screen for 500 ms. Following the mask that separated the primes from
the target, the target was presented centrally (for an individually adjusted
duration, as described below), followed by a central mask consisting of a
row of @ signs. The mask duration was 500 ms minus the duration of the
target for that trial (thereby keeping the interval from target onset to choice
onset constant). The postmask was immediately followed by two choices,
presented to the right and left, with target and foil positions randomly
determined on each trial.
The first 64 trials of the experiment were used to adjust the time of the
target presentation such that performance was at roughly 75% accuracy. Of
the 64 calibration trials, half were neither primed, one quarter were target
primed, and the remaining quarter were foil primed. The other variables
were randomly assigned across trials.
Across participants, the average presentation time of the target was 50
ms, but as in previous studies (e.g., Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, & Quach, 2002;
Huber et al., 2001; Huber, Shiffrin, Quach, & Lyle, 2002), there were large
individual differences. Target-flash times ranged from 25 ms to 108 ms
across participants.
Following the block of 64 calibration trials, there were five blocks with
72 experimental trials each. In every block, each of the 36 conditions—3
(prime condition)  3 (prime presentation)  2 (separation)  2 (delay)—
was presented twice in a new random order.9 Feedback was given after
8 We conducted a pilot experiment that was identical to Experiment 1
with the exception that the two levels of temporal separation were 0 ms and
50 ms. However, the results of this experiment were difficult to interpret
due to an unforeseen confound. In the 0-ms condition, the prime was
masked by the target in the no-separation condition, but the prime was not
masked in the separated condition because the separation was great enough
to place the primes fully above and below the target. To avoid this
confound, we did not include a condition with no temporal separation
between prime and target in Experiment 1. In other words, in Experiment
1, the primes were always followed by pattern masks.
9 Due to an oversight, one of the neither-primed trials in this experiment
was replaced by a target- or foil-primed trial for 19 participants, and two
neither-primed trials were replaced by target- and/or foil-primed trials for
6 participants, making the number of trials in the three prime conditions
slightly uneven for 25 participants.
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every trial. A check mark and the word correct appeared in green when the
answer was correct, and a cross mark (X) and the word incorrect were
presented in red when the answer was incorrect. The feedback stayed on
the screen for 700 ms and was immediately followed by the presentation of
the fixation point for the next trial (unless the current trial was the last trial
in a block).
After each block, participants received feedback providing the percent-
age of correct trials in the last block and the mean response time (this was
the only time when feedback about response time was given, and the
instructions emphasized accuracy rather than response speed). Participants
were encouraged to take a short break between blocks and to resume the
experiment only when they were ready to do so. The entire experiment took
less than 40 min.
Results
To analyze the data, we carried out a 3  3  2  2 (Prime
Condition  Prime Presentation  Separation  Delay) analysis
of variance (ANOVA). All factors were within subject, and the
dependent measure was accuracy. A significance level of .001 was
used for all statistical tests. None of the statistical conclusions
changed when the degrees of freedom of the F tests were adjusted
to account for violation of the sphericity assumption (Geisser &
Greenhouse, 1958). The bar heights in Figure 4 shows the results
aggregated over the two levels of prime delay (none of the effects
involving prime delay were significant). The dots in the figure give
the ROUSE predictions, but discussion of the model predictions is
deferred to the ROUSE Model Applied to Experiments 1–3 sec-
tion. The numerical values for all conditions can be found in
Appendix A. Before turning to the statistical analyses, we call
attention to the fact that the results were not only reliable but quite
large in magnitude, with probability of correct choice ranging from
nearly .3 to over .9.
There were large effects for prime condition, F(2, 136) 
104.62, MSE  0.09; prime presentation, F(2, 136)  76.18,
MSE  0.05; and separation, F(1, 68)  118.11, MSE  0.03. It
is clear from Figure 4 that the Prime Condition  Prime Presen-
tation interaction, F(4, 272)  146.40, MSE  0.04, modulated
these main effects: At the 50-ms prime presentation, performance
was near ceiling when the target was primed, below chance when
the foil was primed, and intermediate when neither the target nor
the foil was primed. Presenting the prime for 1,000 ms radically
changed this pattern of performance. The results reversed such that
mean accuracy was lower for the target-primed condition than for
the neither-primed condition, t(275)  4.835, SE  0.013. The
results for the 95050-ms conditions roughly represented an av-
Figure 3. The sequence of events in Experiment 1. The 950-ms prime was presented only in the 95050-ms
conditions and was always followed by another 50-ms presentation. The first presentation of the prime was
preceded by a 500-ms presentation of a fixation point in the center of the screen (not shown). The duration for
each frame is indicated on the right. Only one of the two frames in the second row was shown on a given trial.
The positions of the target and foil in the two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) test were randomized.
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erage of the 50-ms and 1,000-ms conditions, subject to an inter-
action described next.
Finally, there were significant Prime Condition  Separation,
F(2, 136)  63.43, MSE  0.02, and Prime Condition  Presen-
tation  Separation, F(4, 272)  21.36, MSE  0.02, interactions.
As can be seen from Figure 4, performance in the foil-primed
condition was better when the primes were presented one line apart
than when they were not, particularly in the 50-ms and 95050-ms
prime-presentation conditions. However, for the target-primed
condition, performance with the 95050-ms prime presentation
was worse when the primes were separated compared with when
they were not. For separated primes, mean accuracy for the target-
primed conditions was not lower than that for the neither primed
condition at the 95050-ms prime presentation, t(137)  0.766,
SE  0.020, p  .22.
Discussion
The pattern of results in the 50-ms and 1,000-ms prime-
presentation conditions replicate those of Huber (2005b). For the
50-ms prime presentation, accuracy was nearly .6 higher when the
target was primed than when the foil was primed (interpreted in
ROUSE terms as underdiscounting of evidence from primed fea-
tures); this contrasts with the 1,000-ms prime presentation, for
which the difference between target priming and foil priming
reversed (interpreted in ROUSE terms as overdiscounting of evi-
dence from primed features). Note that the discounting process is
graded in nature, and thus the absence of a priming reversal does
not necessarily imply a lack of discounting but might, instead,
imply that discounting was insufficient to fully or excessively
counteract the effects of source confusion. However, a reversal in
the direction of priming, such as occurred in the 1,000-ms prime
presentation, provides unambiguous evidence that the discounting
process is needed, because this result cannot be explained by
varying levels of source confusion alone.
The important new results come from the 95050-ms condition.
The results in this condition were decidedly different than those in
the 1,000-ms condition, instead appearing similar to the average of
the 1,000-ms and 50-ms conditions. Although this pattern of
results may on first sight be surprising, it can be explained with the
simple assumption that the separate effects of a long and a short
prime presentation combine independently (i.e., each separate pre-
sentation has an independent chance of producing source confu-
sion and discounting for primed features). Presumably, the 50-ms
condition produced some features that were confused with the
target percept, and furthermore, these features were scarcely, if at
all, discounted. Likewise, the 1,000-ms conditions produced fea-
tures that were confused with the target percept, but these were
counteracted by an even larger degree of discounting. According to
an independent-sources interpretation of the 95050-ms condi-
tion, the second presentation (i.e., 50 ms) provided additional
source confusion with little or no additional discounting, resulting
in a preference for the primed choice word despite the total
1,000-ms duration during which the prime was presented in some
form.10 This idea is implemented quantitatively in the ROUSE
Model Applied to Experiments 1–3 section.
In their Experiment 1, using a 2-AFC perceptual identification
task, Huber, Shiffrin, Quach, & Lyle (2002) contrasted a long
priming condition, in which two prime words were presented in
boldface for 2,500 ms, with a long–switch condition, in which two
prime words were first presented regularly for 2,000 ms and then,
following a position switch, presented for an additional 500 ms.
Although the authors’ short condition (i.e., a 500-ms presentation
of two prime words) produced a preference for a primed alterna-
tive, this preference diminished in their long condition and was
even further reduced in their long–switch condition. Superficially,
their long–switch condition seems to have been similar to our
long-then-short (95050-ms) priming condition, so this last result
is puzzling. However, because the second presentation of the
primes was for 500 ms, as compared with 50 ms in the current
situation, it may have been that the above-threshold second pre-
sentation resulted in the continual accrual of discounting. We
assess the generality of this proposed theoretical account in Ex-
periments 2 and 3.
Next, we consider the seemingly curious prime-separation ef-
fects. As seen in Figure 4, it appears that prime separation had a
sizable effect for the 50-ms and 95050-ms conditions but not for
the 1,000-ms condition. More specifically, for both the 50-ms
condition and the 95050-ms condition, presenting the prime
more centrally (i.e., not separated) resulted in a stronger preference
for the primed alternative (i.e., magnification of the difference
between the target-primed and foil-primed conditions). This result
is consistent with the increased priming effect for central primes
observed by Hochhaus and Marohn (1991, Experiment 4).
Surprisingly, we found no effect of prime separation in the
1,000-ms condition. We explain this with the post hoc assumption
that source confusion for brief primes is more highly dependent on
spatial proximity to the target than is source confusion for long
primes. The idea is that long durations allow clear perception,
largely independent of separation, and confusions are therefore
based more on higher level cognitive and attentional factors. Thus,
we modeled these results by assuming one level of source confu-
sion for long prime presentations, regardless of where these pre-
sentations occurred, whereas we allowed separate levels of source
confusion for short presentations, depending on the degree of
visual separation (i.e., less source confusion for primes presented
farther from fixation). Hochhaus and Marohn (1991, Experiment
4) presented a prime for 500 ms and still obtained a sizable
separation effect, so the prime duration required to diminish this
effect may be longer than 500 ms but shorter than 1,000 ms.
However, if attentional (re)deployment to eccentric primes at
longer prime durations is responsible for the diminished separation
effect, then other variables (such as attentional load) are likely to
modulate the influence of prime duration.
Finally, we consider explanations for the lack of effect for delay
between prime offset and target onset (i.e., 50-ms vs. 100-ms mask
following the primes). According to some views, the degree to
which prime features and target features merge would depend on
10 As graphed in Figure 4, the results for the separated 950-ms and
50-ms prime presentations seem to be similar to those for the 1,000-ms
prime presentation. Indeed, the strongest support for the claim that separate
presentations act as separate, independent sources comes from the non-
separated prime presentations. Note, however, that even for the separated
primes, performance is qualitatively different for the 1,000-ms presentation
as compared with the 95050-ms prime presentation: Only the 1,000-ms
presentation resulted in a preference against a primed target.
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the temporal interval separating them. However, the findings of
Sanborn, Malmberg, and Shiffrin (2004) suggest that postmasking
(in our case of both prime and target) tends to cause decisions to
be based on higher level, more abstract features (e.g., letter iden-
tity) rather than on visual form. Such abstract features might
survive short intervals like 50 ms and 100 ms relatively intact.
Furthermore, it is plausible that the critical time at which confu-
sions between target and prime play a role is when the two choices
arrive. From this perspective, increasing the prime–target stimulus
onset asynchrony from 50 ms to 100 ms would have little effect
given the additional 500-ms delay before onset of the choice
words. This view is in keeping with the neural version of ROUSE,
proposed by Huber and O’Reilly (2003), which assumes that
residual prime activation at the time of the choice word presenta-
tion is responsible for the source confusion.
Experiment 2
The results of the 95050-ms conditions of Experiment 1
suggest that each temporally and spatially separate presentation of
a prime can act as a separate source of source confusion and
discounting, which then combine independently to produce an
overall priming effect. This result is particularly important because
it implies that each new presentation of a word is treated as novel
source of information. During the early moments of a presentation,
features may easily migrate and become confused with other
presentations. With additional exposure time, features are still
subject to source confusion, but identification of the presented item
allows for corrective measures. This is a fundamentally different
interpretation of feature binding than has been assumed by others
(e.g., in feature integration theory; Treisman & Gelade, 1980;
Treisman & Gormican, 1988). According to our data, as inter-
preted with the ROUSE model, features are essentially often
“unbound,” even following long exposures, but the decisional
system can partially (or excessively) correct for the unwanted
effects of unbound features by utilizing the expected degree of
source confusion given the known (identified) sources.
If separate presentations provide separate and independent
sources of source confusion and discounting, it should be possible
to arrange matters such that the two choice words could receive
different levels of source confusion and discounting through dif-
ferential priming. In particular, it should be possible to maximize
preference effects by causing underdiscounted source confusion
for one choice word (i.e., by presenting it very briefly as a prime)
and overdiscounted source confusion for the other choice word
(i.e., by priming it for a long time).
Consider a new version of the 95050-ms prime-presentation
condition of Experiment 1: If, for example, a prime matching the
foil is presented for the first 950 ms, this should lead to a prefer-
ence against the foil (caused by overdiscounting of evidence), thus
increasing performance. If a prime matching the target is then
briefly presented near perceptual threshold but at a level sufficient
to generate features and produce source confusions, those features
might be given little or no discounting (because they often go
unattended or unnoticed). This should also lead to a choice of
target and, hence, should also increase performance. These two
effects should summate, thereby producing an even larger en-
hancement of performance than that found in Experiment 1. The
same reasoning, applied to the case in which the long prime
matches the target and the short prime matches the foil, should
result in unusually low performance as compared with the condi-
tions in Experiment 1. Taken together, these predicted effects
should amplify the already large preference effects found in Ex-
periment 1.
Method
Participants. Forty-three undergraduate students at Indiana University
Bloomington participated in exchange for introductory psychology course
credit.
Materials and equipment. Materials and equipment for Experiment 2
were the same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure. Figure 5 illustrates the sequence of events in Experiment 2.
Two factors were crossed within subject. The first factor was the nature of
the first prime. This prime was presented for 950 ms with high vertical
eccentricity (as was the first prime in the 95050-ms condition of Exper-
iment 1) and was identical to the target, the foil, or neither choice. The
second factor was the nature of the second prime. This prime was centrally
presented for 50 ms and also primed the target, the foil, or neither choice.
Thus, there were a total of 9 (3  3) priming conditions. To maintain
consistency with Experiment 1 and to maximize the priming effects, we
presented each prime twice simultaneously (see Figure 5). In the condition
in which both primes were different from the choice words (i.e., neither
primed), the same unrelated word was presented during both prime pre-
sentations.11 The second prime, presented twice simultaneously, was al-
ways presented in vertical alignment without an intervening line and with
zero delay between the second prime and the target. Participants were made
aware of the fact that the two prime presentations could be either the same
word or different words.
The first 72 trials of the experiment were used to adjust the target-flash
durations so as to place performance near 75% accuracy. The number of
trials was equal for each of the nine priming conditions. Across partici-
pants, target presentation times ranged from 42 ms to 125 ms, with an
average of 66 ms.
Following the calibration block of trials, there were five blocks of
experimental trials, with 63 trials in each block. Within each experimental
block, 7 trials of each condition were presented in a new random order. The
rest of the procedure was identical to that described for Experiment 1.
Results
We analyzed the results of Experiment 2 with a 3  3 (First
Prime  Second Prime) ANOVA. As in Experiment 1, the depen-
dent measure was accuracy, and both factors were within subject.
None of the statistical conclusions changed when the degrees of
freedom of the F test were adjusted for violation of the sphericity
assumption (Geisser & Greenhouse, 1958). The results are pre-
sented as bar heights in Figure 6, and the dots give ROUSE
predictions. The numerical values corresponding to the bars and
dots in the figure appear in Appendix B (discussion of the ROUSE
predictions is deferred to the ROUSE Model Applied to Experi-
ments 1–3 section).
The main effect of the first prime (950 ms) was significant, F(2,
11 According to ROUSE, this should produce the same results as the
presentation of two different, unrelated primes as long as it can be assumed
that the unrelated primes share no features with either choice word. To the
extent that an “unrelated” prime shares some features with the choice
words randomly, performance is expected to be slightly lower for neither-
primed conditions using two different primes.
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84)  67.58, MSE  0.01, p  .001. Performance was lowest
when the target was presented as the first prime and higher when
an unrelated word or the foil was presented. The main effect of the
second prime (50 ms) also was significant, F(2, 84)  219.63,
MSE  0.03, p  .001. In contrast to the first prime, performance
was lowest when the second prime was the foil and considerably
higher when it was the target. When the second prime was unre-
lated to both choice words, performance was intermediate. Finally,
there was a significant First Prime  Second Prime interaction,
F(4, 168)  33.77, MSE  0.01, p  .001. In conditions in which
both the first and the second prime were expected to cause per-
formance to increase (the first [long] prime matching the foil, the
second [short] prime matching the target), the effects of the two
primes amplified each other, resulting in performance near ceiling
(M  .91). Similarly, in conditions in which both the first and the
second prime were expected to cause performance to decrease (the
first [long] prime matching the target, the second [short] prime
matching the foil), the effects of both primes again amplified each
other, resulting in performance near floor (M  .26). Most impor-
tant, as predicted, the difference between the short conditions was
larger than that between the long-then-short conditions, t(42) 
6.466, SE  0.036, p  .001, and in turn, the difference between
the conditions priming both choice words was larger than that
between the short conditions, t(42) 6.073, SE 0.032, p .001.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 generally conformed to expecta-
tions based on the assumptions that (a) the two prime presentations
independently activate prime features and (b) matching features
are underdiscounted in the decision process for a short prime
presentation and overdiscounted in the decision process for a long
prime presentation. In cases in which the target or the foil was
presented as a first prime for 950 ms, followed by an unrelated
word prime for 50 ms, performance was about equal (i.e., the long
conditions, depicted in Bars 2 and 3 in Figure 6). Extrapolating
from the results for 1,000-ms prime presentation in Experiment 1,
we expected a small preference against the primed alternative.
Although this trend did not reach significance, this does not
necessarily suggest a lack of discounting. Lower levels of dis-
counting than those seen in the long conditions in Experiment 1
may only attenuate or eliminate the positive priming effect and fall
short of switching the preference against the primed word. The
intervening unrelated prime may have attenuated the excessive
Figure 5. The sequence of events in Experiment 2. The first (950-ms) and second (50-ms) sequential prime
presentations were independently varied (i.e., each could be the target, the foil, or neither, yielding 3  3  9
priming conditions). The presentation of the first prime was preceded by a 500-ms presentation of a fixation
point in the center of the screen (not shown). The duration for each frame is indicated on the right. The positions
of the target and foil in the two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) test were randomized.
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discounting seen in Experiment 1 just enough to eliminate the
preference against the primed word. The significant difference
between the short and long-then-short conditions, as well as that
between the conditions priming both choice words and the short
conditions, clearly suggests the operation of discounting.
For the long-then-short conditions (see Bars 4 and 5 in Figure
6), the primed choice word appeared during both prime presenta-
tions. As in Experiment 1, we assume that the second 50-ms
presentation adds additional source confusion but little or no
additional discounting, resulting in an increased preference for the
primed alternative (compared with the long condition). For the
short conditions (see Bars 6 and 7 in Figure 6), the primed choice
word only appeared during the second 50-ms prime presentation,
and as in Experiment 1, this resulted in a strong preference for the
Figure 6. Results and corresponding ROUSE (responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence)
predictions (represented by the dots) from Experiment 2: The bar heights show the mean proportions of correctly
identified targets (95% confidence intervals [error bars]) for the nine priming conditions. The within-subject
standard error, based on a single-factor repeated measures analysis of variance, is .019 (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
There was always a 950-ms (long) eccentric presentation of a prime word, immediately followed by a 50-ms
(short) central presentation of the same or of a different prime word. In the neither condition, a word that was
different from both choice words was presented during both the long and short durations. In the long conditions,
the primed choice word was presented only during the long duration, and a word that was different from both
choice words was presented for the short presentation. In the long-then-short conditions, the primed choice word
was presented during both the long and short durations. In the short conditions, the primed choice word was
presented only during the short duration (preceded by the presentation of a word different from both choice
words during the long duration). Finally, the short–alternative long (short-alt.long) conditions primed both
choice words differentially. For the last two bars, the labels Target primed and Foil primed refer to the briefly
primed choice word, whereas the alternative choice word was presented for the long duration. The symbolized
screens below the data illustrate the conditions: The top screens refer to the long prime presentation, and the
bottom screens refer to the subsequent short prime presentation. For screens that include two words (i.e.,
TARGET/FOIL or FOIL/TARGET), the words before the slash apply to the conditions labeled as Target primed,
and the words after the slash correspond to conditions labeled as Foil primed. Numerical values are given in
Appendix B.
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primed alternative; we assume that this effect arose due to source
confusion combined with little or no discounting.
Finally, for the conditions priming both choice words (see the
last two bars in Figure 6), one choice word was primed by the
50-ms presentation, and the other choice word was primed by the
950-ms presentation. We assume that brief presentation of a target
prime produces underdiscounting of target features and that long
presentation of a foil prime produces overdiscounting of foil
features. These preference effects combine to produce nearly per-
fect accuracy. We assume the opposite occurs when the target is
primed by a long prime and the foil is primed by a short prime,
producing extremely low accuracy (in fact, accuracy greatly below
the chance level of 50%). In other words, decisions were based
more strongly on these priming effects than on valid perception of
the briefly presented target.
Experiment 3
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that sequential
prime presentations independently activate prime features, which
are then discounted on the basis of prime saliency for each separate
presentation. The effects of these separate presentations sum in-
dependently to determine the preference for each choice word. To
ascertain whether prime saliency, rather than simple prime dura-
tion, is truly the underlying variable, in Experiment 3 we kept the
prime duration constant while manipulating saliency through se-
lective attention. According to the salience hypothesis, instructions
to attend to one prime while ignoring the other should produce
results analogous to those found for primes with different dura-
tions. We expected that instructions to attend to a prime would
increase its saliency, just as does increasing its presentation dura-
tion, and that highly salient primes would result in greater dis-
counting. Thus, features from attended primes should be overdis-
counted, whereas features from ignored primes should be
underdiscounted. Moreover, analogous to our findings in Experi-
ment 2, we expected these preference effects to combine indepen-
dently when both choice words were differentially primed.
Method
Participants. Forty-three undergraduate students at Indiana University
Bloomington participated in exchange for introductory psychology course
credit.
Materials and equipment. Materials and equipment for Experiment 3
were the same as in the previous two experiments.
Procedure. Figure 7 illustrates the sequence of events in Experiment 3.
Each trial started with the presentation of two primes above and below
fixation, one of which was shown in red, whereas the other was shown in
blue. There was one line of separation between the two primes. Participants
were instructed to ignore the blue prime and to make a judgment about the
relative number of vowels and consonants in the red prime. Specifically,
they were asked to press the slash key (labeled RIGHT /	 1) whenever
the absolute difference between the number of vowels and consonants in
the red prime equaled one and to press the Z key (labeled LEFT 
/ 1)
otherwise. Participants were asked to count each vowel or consonant only
once, even if it was repeated in the word. We chose this task because (a)
it requires participants to pay attention to the orthography of the entire red
prime, (b) it is sufficiently difficult to ensure that exposure to the primes is
in the order of seconds, and (c) the pool of 1,000 words used in this
experiment divides almost evenly between the two response categories
(497 words required the RIGHT /	 1 response).
Immediately after the classification of the red prime, the target word
appeared briefly in the middle of the screen, followed by the usual pattern
mask and 2-AFC test, just as in Experiments 1 and 2. Two different prime
words were presented on every trial, and each prime could match the target,
the foil, or neither choice word. Because there were two different primes on
each trial, not all combinations could be realized. Specifically, a condition
requiring the same prime to be attended and ignored (this would be
analogous to the long-then-short condition of Experiment 2) was not
possible. This led to seven priming conditions (see Figure 8): neither
primed, attended prime matched target, attended prime matched foil, ig-
nored prime matched target, ignored prime matched foil, ignored prime
matched target and attended prime matched foil, and ignored prime
matched foil and attended prime matched target.
The first 75 trials of the experiment were used to adjust the target-flash
duration so as to place performance near 75% accuracy. For these calibra-
tion trials, all primes were different from the choice words (i.e., neither
primed). Across participants, target presentation times after calibration
ranged from 8 ms to 158 ms, with an average of 63 ms.
Following the calibration block of trials, there were five blocks of
experimental trials, with 49 trials in each block. Within each experimental
block, 7 trials of each condition were presented in a new random order.
Feedback for both the consonant–vowel task and the perceptual identifi-
cation task was given after every trial. Two check marks and the messages
You classified the word correctly! and You identified the word correctly!
appeared in green when the priming and the perceptual identification tasks
were both solved accurately. If the response on either task was incorrect,
the respective check mark was replaced by a red cross mark, and the
respective message was changed to You did NOT classify the word cor-
rectly! or You did NOT identify the word correctly!, which also appeared
in red. The feedback stayed on the screen for 1,800 ms and was immedi-
ately followed by the next trial (unless the current trial was the last trial in
a block). After each block, participants received feedback on their percent-
ages of correct classifications and identifications in the block. They were
encouraged to take a short break and could resume the experiment when
they were ready to do so. The entire experiment lasted approximately 45
min.
Results
Mean accuracy for the priming task on the red prime was .848
(SE  .009) across participants and conditions. Participants took,
on average, 3,085 ms (SE  62) to complete the priming task. The
results for the perceptual identification task are presented as bar
heights in Figure 8; the dots give the ROUSE predictions. The
numerical values appear in Appendix C (the ROUSE predictions
are discussed below in the ROUSE Model Applied to Experiments
1–3 section). Because not all theoretically possible combinations
of the variables attended (neither/target/foil) and ignored (neither/
target/foil) were realized in this experiment (due to the restriction
that two different primes be presented on each trial), we tested
specific contrasts for statistical significance. There was no signif-
icant difference between the attended target-primed condition and
the attended foil-primed condition, t(42)  0.107, SE  0.037, p
 .46. There was significantly higher accuracy for the ignored
target-primed condition than for the ignored foil-primed condition,
t(42)  4.752, SE  0.135, p  .001. A similar finding obtained
in a comparison of the target-ignored–foil-attended condition and
the foil-ignored–target-attended condition, t(42)  6.160, SE 
0.036, p  .001. It is important to note that the difference between
these conditions was larger in the latter case, t(42)  2.024, SE 
0.044, p  .05.
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Discussion
Experiment 3 demonstrated that the effects of prime duration
and the combination of multiple primes of different durations
generalize to the case in which attention to the primes, rather than
prime duration, is manipulated. Analogous to the results of Exper-
iment 2, the results of Experiment 3 generally conform to expec-
tations resulting from the assumptions that (a) both primes inde-
pendently activate prime features and (b) matching features are
underdiscounted in the decision process if the prime is ignored and
overdiscounted in the decision process if the prime is attended.
Hence, decisions in the 2-AFC test were biased in favor of ignored
primes. This replication of the results from Experiment 2 is im-
portant, because many studies have used similar techniques to
study selective attention (e.g., Sperling, Wurst, & Lu, 1993; see
also Tipper, 2001).
The lack of preference against an attended prime does not
provide evidence against the proposed discounting of attended
prime features. Analogous to our argument regarding the lack of
preference against the primed choice word in the long condition of
Experiment 2, we believe that discounting of attended prime
features in the present experiment was not strong enough to cause
a preference reversal (as was seen in Experiment 1) but that, rather,
discounting was merely sufficient to eliminate a positive priming
effect. The claim of discounting for attended primes finds support
in an examination of conditions in which one choice was primed
by an attended prime whereas the other was primed by an ignored
prime: If there were no effect of an attended prime, performance in
these conditions (see the rightmost bars in Figure 8) should have
been identical to that in the ignored conditions. Instead, priming
the alternative choice by means of an attended prime magnified the
preference effect, as would be the case if attended primes resulted
in discounting. This pattern of results is highly similar to that of the
short conditions and the conditions priming both choice words in
Experiment 2 and thus supports the generality of our findings.
Previous studies using this paradigm have also manipulated
attention to the primes, but these studies have confounded the
attentional instructions with prime duration (Huber et al., 2001).
Whereas Huber, Shiffrin, Quach, and Lyle (2002) established that
Figure 7. The sequence of events in Experiment 3. Primes were presented in the same font as targets, but one
prime was shown in red (underlined in the figure), whereas the other prime was shown in blue (italicized in the
figure; the up–down positions of the red and blue primes were randomly counterbalanced). The primes stayed
onscreen for the duration of the consonant–vowel task (i.e., the selective-attention manipulation), which was in
relation to the red prime (M  3,085 ms). Once a response was given, the primes were immediately replaced
by the target flash. Primes were repetitions of the target, the foil, or neither choice word. Two unique primes were
presented on each trial, thus eliminating certain combinations (i.e., it was not possible for a single prime to be
attended and ignored on the same trial). The durations for the other frames are indicated on the right. The
positions of the target and foil in the two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) test were randomized.
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prime duration alone can account for the differences between
active and passive priming, the present experiment is the first
strong demonstration that attentional instructions also influence
discounting. Under the assumption that attention to a prime and
explicit memory for that prime covary positively, our results are
consistent with those of Huber, Shiffrin, Quach, & Lyle (2002),
who found excessive discounting for remembered primes and
underdiscounting for forgotten primes, even when prime duration
was held constant.
Although our experimental design resembles the designs of
many studies demonstrating negative priming (see Fox, 1995, for
a review), we did not find an inhibited response to the ignored
prime when it reappeared as the target—in fact, the opposite was
the case. Following an application of ROUSE to the data of our
experiments, we return to this apparent discrepancy in the General
Discussion.
ROUSE Model Applied to Experiments 1–3
Although all of the experiments presented here are conceptually
similar in that they demonstrate how primes of different saliency
influence perceptual identification, both alone and in combination,
the nature of the prime presentations in Experiments 1 and 2 is
quite similar, but it is different from that in Experiment 3. We
therefore chose to fit the ROUSE model simultaneously to the data
of Experiments 1 and 2 and to estimate parameters for Experiment
3 separately.
ROUSE Applied to Experiments 1 and 2
The assumption in ROUSE that primed features are discounted
only makes sense in situations in which the system has knowledge
of the features that are in the prime(s); in previous studies with
2-AFC perceptual identification (e.g., Huber et al., 2001), primes
were presented well above threshold, so such knowledge was
presumably available and discounting could occur. However, in
situations in which the prime is presented very briefly, the system
may have very little or no knowledge of the prime features,
reducing or eliminating the use of discounting. The 50-ms prime
presentations in the present experiments are not very salient, so we
assumed that the decisional system did not discount such primes at
all (i.e., we set the estimated probability that features are activated
by the prime, , to 0).
We assumed that prime separation changed the probability that
features were activated by the prime (i.e., ) only for short prime
durations. For long prime durations, the same  was assumed for
both levels of separation (see the Discussion section of Experiment
1). In addition, the same  was applied to both the 1,000-ms
Figure 8. Results and corresponding ROUSE (responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence)
predictions (represented by the dots) from Experiment 3: The bar heights show the mean proportions of correctly
identified targets (95% confidence intervals [error bars]) for the seven priming conditions. The within-subject
standard error, based on a single-factor repeated measures analysis of variance, is .020 (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
The color of the last two bars refers to the prime that was ignored while the other prime was attended to.
Numerical values are given in Appendix C. Alt.  alternative.
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prime-presentation conditions and the first 950 ms of the
95050-ms conditions, because these durations hardly differed,
and the results of Experiment 1 suggested that vertical eccentricity
of the prime display does not matter at such durations. As in
previous applications of the ROUSE model (e.g., Huber et al.,
2001; Huber, Shiffrin, Quach, & Lyle, 2002),  and  were set
to their true values, and  was fixed at .02.
Thus, we fit the ROUSE model simultaneously to the data from
Experiments 1 and 2 by estimating the following five parameters:
1. the probability that a feature is activated by a short (i.e.,
50-ms) prime presentation when the prime display is
central (Scen),
2. the probability that a feature is activated by a short (i.e.,
50-ms) prime presentation when the prime display is
separated (Ssep),
3. the probability that a feature is activated by a long (i.e.,
950- or 1,000-ms) prime presentation (L),
4. the estimated probability that a feature is activated by a
long (i.e., 950- or 1,000-ms) prime presentation (L), and
5. the probability that a feature is activated by the target
flash ().
The probability of feature activation across the two prime presen-
tations for the 95050-ms conditions, 95050cen (i.e., the 50-ms
presentation is central) and 95050sep (i.e., the 50-ms presentation
is separated), were calculated by probabilistic summation of the
appropriate s for the first and the second prime presentation,
assuming independence,12 as specified in Equation 2,
95050cen  L  Scen  L  Scen, (2)
and Equation 3,
95050sep  L  Ssep  L  Ssep. (3)
Because we assumed that only long prime presentations (950 ms or
1,000 ms) resulted in any degree of discounting, words that were
presented for a long duration were assigned the same level of
discounting (i.e., the estimate of prime activation, L) regardless of
whether these words were also presented a second time for 50 ms.
In the original version of the ROUSE model (Huber et al.,
2001), each trial was simulated probabilistically, but recently a
computationally more efficient analytic method of calculating
ROUSE predictions was developed by Huber (2005a). We used
this analytic method for the current application.
The maximum likelihood chi-square error measure that was
used by Huber et al. (2001; see also Correction to Huber et al.
[2001], 2001), was used to obtain parameter estimates. For the
fitting routine, a direct search algorithm, as proposed by Hooke
and Jeeves (1961), was used (the actual implementation of the
algorithm by Johnson, 1994, was based on Algol pseudocode
published by Kaupe, 1963, with the improvements suggested by
Bell & Pike, 1966, and Tomlin & Smith, 1969).
The model predictions for the experiments are presented graph-
ically in the Figures 4 and 6 and numerically in Appendixes A and
B. The corresponding parameters for these predictions were as
follows: Scen  .084, Ssep  .062, L  .071, L  .082, and
  .050. One has to be careful not to attribute too much signif-
icance to the absolute  values. Huber (2005a) explored the
parameter variance–covariance matrix, finding that the difference
between the actual and the estimated probabilities of feature acti-
vation by the prime is crucial for a good fit (i.e., 	  is critical),
but the absolute value of these probabilities is less important (when
the absolute value of  is shifted, reestimates of the other param-
eter values often produce almost equally good fits). It is clear from
the figures that the pattern of results is captured by the ROUSE
model, with the assumption of independent summation of effects
for multiple prime sources.
In evaluating the goodness of the fit, it should be stressed that to
keep the number of free parameters to a minimum, we have made
strong assumptions that are likely to be only approximately true.
For example, the probability that a feature is activated by the target
flash () was assumed to be the same across experiments and
across the different conditions in each experiment. Different levels
of performance in the baseline neither-primed conditions suggest
that this assumption does not precisely hold. Small changes in the
rate of feature extraction from the target could be due to slight
differences in the calibration procedures; different forward mask-
ing characteristics in the different conditions; and, perhaps, atten-
tional effects, but we chose not to allow free parameters to capture
such differences. Instead, the simple model we have described
fully captures the qualitative pattern of the results.
ROUSE Applied to Experiment 3
Because prime duration was considerably above threshold in all
conditions of Experiment 3, we had no reason to believe that any
condition was immune to discounting. Therefore, fitting the model
to the data of Experiment 3 involved estimating the following five
parameters:
1. the probability that a feature is activated by an ignored
prime (I),
2. the probability that a feature is activated by an attended
prime (A),
3. the estimated probability that a feature is activated by an
ignored prime (I),
4. the estimated probability that a feature is activated by an
attended prime (A), and
5. the probability that a feature is activated by the target
flash ().
Parameter estimation was done as described for Experiments 1
and 2, yielding the following parameter estimates: I  .064,
12 An alternative way to model the data would be to assume that only
one prime presentation probabilistically dictates the level of source con-
fusion and discounting on any given trial. We cannot distinguish this
alternative account from the account proposed here with the data from our
experiments, but note that fitting this alternative model would require an
additional parameter to determine the probability that each prime is the
critical prime on a given trial.
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A  .064, I  .043, A  .073, and   .040. Again, it is
important to stress that these exact  values are not crucial for a
good fit: Changes in the absolute values of the actual prime
activation probability (i.e., ) can be compensated by correspond-
ing changes in the values for the estimated prime activation prob-
ability (i.e., ) over wide ranges of the parameter space. Although
the best fitting values for I and A were equal, we obtained good
fits when constraining them to differ by varying amounts, provided
that the estimated prime activation probabilities were adjusted
accordingly.
The model predictions are shown graphically in Figure 8 and
numerically in Appendix C. It is clear that the fit of the model to
the data is almost perfect, capturing the data both quantitatively
and qualitatively. However, the ratio of free parameters to data
points is much larger in the present fit than for Experiments 1 and 2.
Alternative Models
Huber and O’Reilly (2003) developed a neural network model
for short-term priming called nROUSE (a neural mechanism for
responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence). This
model can account for some results that ROUSE cannot explain,
and it can be adapted to handle response times and accuracy results
simultaneously. However, it is a more powerful model with more
mechanisms, and its increased explanatory power is not needed for
the experiments presented in this article.
As an alternative to ROUSE, Ratcliff and McKoon (2001)
developed a multinomial model that has been successfully applied
to similar short-term priming data. This model is similar to
ROUSE at an abstract level in that it also contains the opposing
mechanisms of source confusion and discounting. However, the
feature representation and probabilistic activation in ROUSE allow
for a priori predictions regarding similarity relations and duration
manipulations and their effects on priming, whereas the multino-
mial model has had to be adjusted appropriately for each new data
set collected (see Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, & Quach, 2002, for a
related discussion). In any case, the experiments presented in the
current situation were not specifically designed to differentiate
between the multinomial model and ROUSE.
General Discussion
The study of short-term repetition priming using forced choice
perceptual identification has highlighted the importance of mod-
eling decision processes in addition to perceptual processes. The
experiments presented here and previous research (e.g., Huber,
Shiffrin, Lyle, & Quach, 2002; Huber et al., 2001; Huber, Shiffrin,
Quach, & Lyle, 2002; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2001) provide strong
evidence that two offsetting components—one largely perceptual
or memorial (source confusion) and one largely decisional (dis-
counting; see Footnote 1)—are needed to fully explicate priming
phenomena. To date, only a few theories have explicitly included
decisional aspects of the priming task, (Huber & O’Reilly, 2003;
Huber et al., 2001; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2001), but in general such
effects are likely to exist in many situations, particularly when the
identity of the prime is known.
Source confusion refers to information arising from prime pre-
sentations (and from visual noise) that is confused with informa-
tion arising from the target presentation. Such confusion produces
a tendency to choose the word that is similar to the prime(s).
Discounting of information known to have been in primes is used
to counteract this preference. The degree of discounting must be
estimated for the system to calculate evidence in favor of the two
choices, and the estimated values may not match the actual degree
of source confusion. In general, brief or ignored presentations
result in too little discounting; in fact, primes near or below the
threshold of explicit identification produce some degree of source
confusion but may produce no discounting. In this case, underdis-
counting produces a preference to choose the primed alternative.
Long-duration or highly attended prime presentations can produce
overestimation of source confusion and, thus, overdiscounting.
This produces a tendency to choose the unprimed alternative.
Prior to the current set of experiments, ROUSE did not specify
the nature of sequential prime presentations at different locations
or the effect of differential attention to primes. In advance of these
experiments, it was not clear how such factors would affect either
the source confusion or the discounting mechanisms, nor how
these factors would combine across presentations. In particular,
our results strongly constrain the manner in which primes can
reinforce or compete with each other when primes are presented
for different durations and at different locations or are attended
differentially.
In Experiment 1, we presented the same prime word at two
different points in time, each in a different visual location. The first
presentation was long (950 ms) and the second very brief (50 ms).
In other conditions, we presented only a single prime presentation
for a long duration (1,000 ms) or a very brief one (50 ms). Very
brief presentations resulted in source confusion but little or no
discounting (cf. Paap, Chun, & Vonnahme, 1999, Experiment 1,
who also found large preference effects for brief primes), whereas
long presentations resulted in source confusion as well as exces-
sive discounting. The condition that presented the same prime for
both a long duration and then a brief duration was well explained
using the ROUSE model with the simple assumption that the
source confusion and discounting from each presentation sum
together independently to determine overall performance levels.
This experiment also demonstrated that brief delays between prime
and target do not significantly reduce source confusion (presum-
ably because high-level features survive short delays and/or the
slight delays are inconsequential in comparison with the much
longer delays until the choices appear) and that presenting primes
in visual locations more distant from the fixation point can reduce
source confusion for brief, but not long, prime presentations (pre-
sumably because longer presentations allow attention to be [re]de-
ployed to the primes).
In Experiment 2, we further tested the findings from Experiment
1 by putting the different levels of discounting associated with
brief and long primes in competition or cooperation with one
another. This was done by priming each choice separately, with
one receiving a long prime and the other a brief prime. In this case,
the results imply that different levels of prime-induced preference
can exist for each choice word and that these combine to determine
overall performance. Briefly priming one choice word (i.e., induc-
ing a preference for that choice word due to source confusion with
too little or no discounting) and a long prime presentation of the
other choice word (i.e., inducing a preference against that choice
word due to excessive discounting) combined to produce very
large preference effects.
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The results of Experiments 1 and 2 can be interpreted in terms
of salience, with longer presentations resulting in highly salient
primes, which were therefore more strongly discounted in the
decision process. To test this interpretation, we manipulated atten-
tion as another variable that should affect prime salience in Ex-
periment 3. By including a prime identification task, we induced
selective attention to one of two primes while holding prime
duration constant across both primes. As with the duration manip-
ulations of Experiments 1 and 2, we observed underdiscounting for
ignored primes and excessive discounting for attended primes. As
in Experiment 2, these effects combined across choices, increasing
preference effects when both choice words were differentially
primed.
Paap et al. (2000, Experiment 3) compared repetition priming
for words of low and high frequency. In their experiment, a related
(e.g., junk) or neutral (e.g., xxxx) prime presented for 2,000 ms was
followed by a brief target (e.g., JUNK), and participants had to
identify a particular letter of the target in a subsequent 2-AFC test
(for this example, the choice words would be JUNK and BUNK).
Paap et al. (2000) found an increase in performance for trials using
related primes compared with trials using neutral primes for low-
frequency targets only. For high-frequency targets, performance
for trials using related primes was actually slightly worse than that
for trials using neutral primes (although this difference was not
statistically significant). Referring to this interaction with word
frequency, Paap et al. (2000) concluded that “because no model
predicts that an identity prime should interfere with target process-
ing, it appears reasonable to treat the difference as noise” (p.
1697). With ROUSE, there is now a model that predicts that
identity primes can elicit performance deficits under certain cir-
cumstances. If it can be assumed that high-frequency primes are
more salient than low-frequency primes (all other things being
equal), then this aspect of Paap et al.’s (2000) data can be readily
explained within the ROUSE framework by positing that a higher
level of discounting for the high-frequency primes eliminates the
positive priming effect found for low-frequency primes. The fact
that there was a preference for the primed low-frequency target
and no statistically significant preference against the primed high-
frequency target, despite the prolonged prime duration, may have
been due to the high similarity of the choice words. As demon-
strated by Huber et al. (2001), ROUSE predicts that discounting
will be less effective when fewer features discriminate between the
choice words. Furthermore, it is important to note that in Paap et
al.’s (2000) Experiment 3, the delay between prime and target was
relatively long—the prime and target were separated by a warning
signal (LOOK) and a premask, each of which lasted 1,000 ms—
and thus it is unclear to what extent a theory of short-term priming
should even apply. At this point, our interpretation of Paap et al.’s
(2000) result is highly speculative. Future research using a para-
digm capable of indexing decisional aspects of the task will be
needed to ascertain whether word frequency is yet another variable
affecting salience, and therefore discounting, similar to our ma-
nipulations of prime duration and attention.
Repetition Blindness
Repetition priming deficits similar to the ones observed in some
conditions in the present experiments are routinely found in rapid
serial visual presentation (RSVP) identification tasks and are
known as repetition blindness (e.g., Kanwisher, 1987; Park &
Kanwisher, 1994). Huber et al. (2001) discussed how ROUSE
could be adapted to an RSVP identification task to account for
these deficits in terms of overdiscounting of evidence from primed
features.
The term repetition blindness, however, is not only used for
RSVP identification tasks but has also been applied to repetition
priming deficits in the perceptual identification of targets in single-
prime–target trials (e.g., Hochhaus & Johnston, 1996; Hochhaus &
Marohn, 1991). The ROUSE model is directly applicable to these
results and predicts repetition blindness whenever the prime is
salient enough to cause sufficient overdiscounting of evidence
from primed features.
Negative Priming
The results of the present experiments, as well as the predictions
of the ROUSE theory, seem to be at odds with certain negative
priming (NP) findings. In a typical NP experiment, a target and
distractor are presented simultaneously, and the task for the par-
ticipant is to make a response to the target while ignoring the
distractor (which is distinguished from the target by some cue,
such as color). NP refers to the finding that the response latency for
a target in trial n is increased when that target served as distractor
in trial n 	 1 (a decrease in response latency—i.e., a positive
priming effect—is usually found if the target on trial n also served
as target on trial n 	 1; for a review, see Fox, 1995).
If the target and distractor of trial n 	 1 serve as primes for trial
n, ROUSE predicts sizable discounting for features from the at-
tended prime (i.e., the target on trial n 	 1) and relatively little
discounting for features from the ignored prime (i.e., the distractor
on trial n 	 1). This should cause a priming benefit for previous
distractors and a priming deficit for previous targets, which is
exactly the opposite of the NP phenomenon.
When evaluating the discrepancies between our results and
those of studies finding NP, it is crucial to note several important
differences. First of all, NP manifests primarily in response times.
Almost all studies investigating NP use response time as the main
dependent variable and are designed such that accuracy is nearly
perfect. The only study we are aware of that found NP in accuracy
data in which accuracy of the task was not close to ceiling is that
of Neill and Terry (1995), although their task was quite different
from our perceptual identification task. Santee and Egeth (1982)
suggested that accuracy measures different perceptual processes
for short and long target exposures and, furthermore, that accuracy
for short target exposures (such as those used in our 2-AFC
perceptual identification paradigm) measures processes distinct
from those measured by response time. Second, NP is not always
reliably obtained, and when it is obtained, the effect is usually
small (around 20 ms). There is continued dispute regarding the
necessary and sufficient conditions for obtaining the NP effect
(Fox, 1995).
In several unpublished studies, we have tried to mimic condi-
tions under which NP is usually obtained but to do so within our
2-AFC perceptual identification paradigm. In none of these studies
did we find NP. At this point, it is unclear how best to reconcile the
findings of NP (using response time paradigms) and the seemingly
opposite result in our 2-AFC paradigm, and we leave such recon-
ciliation to future research.
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Conclusions
We started this article with discussion of a puzzle: How can one
make sense of the finding that primes whose presence is hard to
ascertain produce as much or more priming than primes well above
threshold? We have explicated this puzzle by using a model in
which both the magnitude and the direction of priming is a func-
tion of the difference between activation of confusable prime
features and estimates of that activation. Of course, we have gone
much further. Using the assumption that primes near threshold
produce source confusion but little or no discounting, and that
above threshold primes produce both source confusion and dis-
counting (sometimes more discounting than confusion), we have
been able to account for a host of not very intuitive findings,
including the way that multiple primes of different saliency com-
bine. It is important to note that ROUSE is not limited to repetition
word priming and, indeed, has been successfully applied to exper-
iments using associative, orthographic, and phonological priming
(Huber et al., 2001; Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, & Quach, 2002) as well
as to experiments using faces instead of words (Huber, 2005b).
The results of these studies suggest that source confusion and
discounting are general mechanisms and are not limited to a
specific task or stimulus class.
These results significantly advance understanding of short-term
priming phenomena specifically and of information processing
more generally. For instance, phenomena similar to those of per-
ceptual source confusion and discounting have been observed in
the literature on social cognition, in which they are known as
behavioral assimilation and contrast (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al.,
1998). These results and others suggest that compensatory mech-
anisms, such as discounting, play a critical role in directing be-
havior in a wide variety of tasks, and for a wide variety of levels
of representation, ranging from low-level perception to high-level
conception. From this wider analysis, compensation does not ex-
clusively result from explicit strategic control but, rather, is viewed
as a feature of human cognitive architecture to accommodate basic
limitations, such as source confusion, in the attempt to guide
behavior in an optimal, or near optimal, manner.
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Appendix A
Mean Accuracy (With Standard Errors in Parentheses) and Corresponding ROUSE Predictions for Experiment 1
Separation and
delay
50-ms prime 1,000-ms prime 95050-ms prime
Neither
primed
Target
primed
Foil
primed
Neither
primed
Target
primed
Foil
primed
Neither
primed
Target
primed
Foil
primed
None
50 ms .652 (.021) .913 (.015) .312 (.027) .789 (.021) .728 (.025) .797 (.021) .688 (.022) .835 (.020) .515 (.029)
100 ms .672 (.022) .896 (.015) .319 (.029) .816 (.020) .753 (.021) .823 (.021) .713 (.020) .845 (.019) .490 (.032)
ROUSE .763 .909 .454 .763 .727 .745 .763 .840 .603
1 text line
50 ms .771 (.023) .900 (.017) .531 (.030) .828 (.023) .770 (.021) .845 (.021) .807 (.020) .783 (.023) .753 (.021)
100 ms .728 (.021) .877 (.019) .478 (.028) .872 (.018) .811 (.021) .854 (.021) .777 (.021) .771 (.022) .706 (.024)
ROUSE .763 .875 .546 .763 .727 .745 .763 .814 .643
Note. Within-subject standard error (based on pooled error terms): .019 (Loftus & Masson, 1994). ROUSE  responding optimally with unknown sources
of evidence.
Appendix B
Mean Accuracy (With Standard Errors in Parentheses) and Corresponding ROUSE Predictions for Experiment 2
Accuracy
First prime (950 ms)/second prime (50 ms)
N/N N/T N/F T/N T/T T/F F/N F/T F/F
Observed .780 (.023) .923 (.017) .476 (.029) .672 (.023) .839 (.026) .264 (.022) .690 (.023) .907 (.020) .627 (.027)
ROUSE .763 .909 .454 .727 .840 .190 .745 .948 .603
Note. Within-subject standard error (based on a single-factor, repeated measures analysis of variance): .019 (Loftus & Masson, 1994). ROUSE 
responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence; N  neither; T  target; F  foil.
Appendix C
Mean Accuracy (With Standard Errors in parentheses) and Corresponding ROUSE Predictions for the Perceptual
Identification Task in Experiment 3
Accuracy
Condition
N primed TA FA TI FI TI & FA FI & TA
Observed .718 (.025) .684 (.030) .688 (.031) .774 (.024) .639 (.032) .773 (.022) .550 (.034)
ROUSE .723 .698 .703 .765 .642 .756 .528
Note. Within-subject standard error (based on a single-factor, repeated measures analysis of variance): .020 (Loftus & Masson, 1994). ROUSE 
responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence; N  neither; TA  target attended; FA  foil attended; TI  target ignored; FI  foil ignored.
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